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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INTERPRETATION AND ACCESSIBILITY

KAREN PETROSKI*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Eskridge’s lecture reminds us that the issue of interpretation—
and statutory interpretation in particular—has been a topic of discussion
among judges and legal theorists for decades. Yet there is clearly still much
more to say on the matter. And despite the consistently recognized centrality of
interpretation to legal practice, interpretation remains a highly contested
undertaking—not only in its application, but in its very description. What are
we talking about when we refer to statutory interpretation? Is it a matter of
what lawyers and judges do already, or a matter of self-conscious practice?
Should it be one or the other, or is it satisfactory for it to be both? Would these
questions be answered differently from a scholar’s perspective and from a
judge’s? Should they be? These last questions have new significance in the
contemporary legal academy, in which the relationships among teaching,
scholarship, and practice are being critically re-examined and might be in the
process of being reformed in a lasting way.
My remarks will not answer these questions but will, rather, seek to make
the case for asking them explicitly and discussing the answers we would want
to endorse as a responsible educational community. Below, I first discuss the
central role that the concept of interpretation has played in dominant scholarly
theories of law and legal activity. Then, I briefly examine the influence (or lack
of influence) of this theoretical trend on the law school curriculum. I then turn
to the current climate of legal education, and in particular the impact of the
discourse of accessibility in contemporary discussions of this institution and
the reasons the imperative of accessibility might be an elusive goal. I conclude
by identifying some key questions for community discussion that emerge from
the developments I describe, focusing on the question of whether legal theory
and legal interpretation can be, or should be, radically accessible activities.

* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan Bollozos and
Jordan Panger for research assistance and to William Eskridge, Joel Goldstein, and the other
participants in the 2012 Childress Lecture proceedings—especially Liz O’Brien and the staff of
the Saint Louis University Law Journal—for making possible the forum in which these ideas
were initially presented.
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I. THE CENTRALITY OF INTERPRETATION TO MODERN THEORIES OF LAW
The history of modern Anglo-American legal theory is partly a story about
the rise to dominance of legal positivism, as Professor Eskridge’s paper (and
Professor Shapiro’s recent book, discussed further below) have recounted. But
it is also a story of increasing attention to the close relationship—perhaps even
amounting to an identity—between those practices we call “legal” and the
human activity we call “interpretation,” which I will define for purposes of this
discussion as referring to the identification of the meaning or significance of
communications.
Professor Eskridge notes this connection very early in his lecture, when he
remarks that since 1957, statutory interpretation has been a “locus for
jurisprudential theory.”1 Herbert Hart’s exchange with Lon Fuller of that year
took the practice of statutory interpretation to be illustrative of the implications
and shortcomings of legal positivism.2 But this focus by legal theorists on the
interpretation of statutes dates back well beyond the mid-twentieth century.
Those fathers of Anglo-American positivism Jeremy Bentham and John
Austin, at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries,
both also treated legislation and its interpretation as core components of their
theories of law.3
As the presentations in this symposium show, Anglo-American
jurisprudence since the Hart-Fuller debate has continued to draw on statutory
interpretation as a central example and a proving ground for theories of law.4
Most of the scholars since Hart and Fuller who have sought to explain what is
unique about what lawyers and judges do have made interpretation central to
that explanation. Since the 1970s, for example, Ronald Dworkin has been
developing a theory of law (which has since evolved into a more general

1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of
Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 866 (2013).
2. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607–11 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958).
3. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 323–25
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED 10–17, 31–32, 107–08 (Wilfrid Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
4. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency Versus Ordinary Meaning Advocacy, 57 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 975 (2013) (observing that certain approaches, including the ordinary meaning
approach, “is promoted by liberals and conservatives, purposivists as well as textualists”);
Victoria F. Nourse, Decision Theory and Babbitt v. Sweet Home: Skepticism About Norms,
Discretion, and the Virtues of Purposivism, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 909 (2013) (explaining that
norms are drawn from a diversity of areas and that normativity, as a result, deserves more
academic attention and less “closeting”).
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theory of morality) that centers on interpretation.5 According to Dworkin
today, not only is law basically an “interpretive” activity, but so is morality
more generally.6 An implication of his position is that if we can reach an
understanding of interpretation, we will be able to understand what makes law
and legal activity what they are.
Dworkin is not usually classed as a legal positivist,7 and as Professor
Eskridge has explained, there is no necessary connection between the
assumption that interpretation is central to legal activity and the positivist
position that we can describe law fully without recourse to normative
statements.8 But theorists who account for the nature of law quite differently
from Dworkin share his emphasis on the centrality of interpretation to their
accounts of law. Antonin Scalia, for example—considered by some observers
to be an orthodox positivist, or to represent himself as such—has also made
legal interpretation, specifically the interpretation of statutes and constitutional
text, central to his account of what law is and what it should be, at least from
the judge’s perspective.9 And Scott Shapiro, who has recently advanced a
theory of law that seeks to bridge the divide between positivist and nonpositivist theories, has also, in the process, put interpretation in general and
statutory interpretation in particular at the core of his theory of what law is and
what it should be.10 Shapiro advances a theory that understands legal rules as
plans; he supports his account mostly through examples of rules that are either
analogous to or actually are legislative enactments.11 Moreover, he argues that
his theory is accurate specifically because it justifies a defensible approach to
interpretation.12
Many of the most prominent contemporary legal theorists writing in
English thus seem to agree that to understand what law is and how it functions,
we need to understand legal interpretation, and especially statutory
interpretation. As a result, as Professor Eskridge’s lecture indicates, most of
these theorists also offer theories of statutory interpretation as components of
their theories of law. Yet these theorists disagree in some fundamental ways
about what law is and, accordingly, about the most appropriate or best theory

5. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii–xv (1977); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 87–113, 225–28, 410–13 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 6–7, 34–
35 (2006); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 1–19, 400–15 (2011).
6. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5, at 166–70, 400–09.
7. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 265–67 (2011).
8. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 867–68, 894, 906–07.
9. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9–
18, 37–44 (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 51 (2012).
10. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 7.
11. Id. at 119, 195–97, 225.
12. Id. at 170–73.
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of statutory interpretation. They also disagree, albeit less explicitly, about what
interpretation itself is. They seem to concur that some activity related to
communication, meaning, and action lies at the core of legal activity, but their
characterizations of that activity vary widely. For Dworkin, for example,
interpretation is a realization of community values, a form of conceptual and
cognitive harmonization.13 For Scalia, it is more concretely a form of fidelity
to textual authority, or as he puts it in his most recent book, “how a legal
message is to be received by those who must apply its directives.”14 For
Shapiro, interpretation involves the implementation of plans that happen to be
expressed in texts to resolve otherwise irresolvable moral quandaries.15
Legal theorists thus agree that a central part of what lawyers and judges do,
and should be doing, is interpreting the law, with statutes understood as the
paradigmatic form of the law. They also seem generally to agree, despite their
theoretical differences, that interpretation requires some shared understanding
or community to work.16 But apparently no shared understanding of that
practice itself exists; in fact, these theorists distinguish themselves from one
another in part based on the differences between their accounts of what
interpretation—and therefore law—is.
II. THE STATUS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY
Legal theorists like Dworkin, Scalia, and Shapiro are presenting
descriptions of what law is, and we recognize them as experts on this matter.
We also know from our everyday experience, however, that whatever else law
is, what lawyers and judges do must count as law. And in the United States,
part of what lawyers and judges have in common is their education within a
particular institution: the law school. If the theorists are right that interpretation
is central to what lawyers and judges do and should be doing, then it might
seem to follow that in educating future lawyers and judges, we should be
teaching them how to perform that activity, and it might also follow that we
need to teach them what the activity is that they are being taught. But it is far
from clear that we are doing this.
In his most recent book, for example, Scalia argues that we are not.17 And
indeed, the law school curriculum does not focus directly on legal or statutory
interpretation outside of courses on legislation and some constitutional law

13.
14.
15.
16.

See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5, at 160–70.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 42.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 201–02, 213–14.
See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5, at 160–62, 405–07; SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 9, at xxvii; SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 204–06.
17. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 7–9.
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courses.18 At many law schools, these are not required courses.19 A concern
that students at such schools might graduate without any explicit instruction in
either the theory or practice of legal interpretation motivated several
participants in this symposium to urge strongly that these courses be made a
standard part of law school coursework.
On the other hand, if legal interpretation is nothing more than the practice
of understanding the law and constructing arguments about what it means—as
some theorists might argue20—then the existing law school curriculum is
already addressing and teaching legal interpretation, perhaps sufficiently. It
might be that students need not be taught what interpretation is, as long as they
are taught how to do it. And if scholars and educators cannot agree about
exactly what interpretation is, it might be futile to expect more than this kind of
diffuse training in interpretation as a kind of “know-how.”21
Is this enough? Should law professors be debating the nature of law and
legal interpretation if we cannot explain how this debate relates to what goes
on in law school classrooms? It is becoming increasingly difficult to answer
this question affirmatively—not just when focusing on the sufficiency of
instruction in legal interpretation in the current legal curriculum, but also when
considering other aspects of the standard legal curriculum. Long-term concerns
about the shape of legal education have become more urgent over the past
several years.22 We are hearing and talking more and more about the gaps

18. Id.; see also Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58
J. LEGAL EDUC. 166, 169 (2008) (advocating the addition of legislative courses to first-year law
school curricula).
19. Of the nineteen law schools whose 2012–13 curricula were surveyed for this essay, only
six (Harvard, Columbia, New York University, Georgetown, University of California-Hastings,
and Fordham) require a course in Legislation (usually in the form of a second-semester course in
legislation and regulation). See Appendix, infra. A similar proportion of law schools offer courses
in legislative drafting or legislative clinics. See id. Courses focusing specifically on legal
interpretation appear rare outside the most elite law schools. See id.
20. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 87–113, 225–28, 410–13; SHAPIRO,
supra note 7, at 302–06.
21. See, e.g., HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 23 (2007) (“Over
the last half-century, the most important transformation in the way expertise has been understood
is a move . . . toward a . . . wisdom-based or competence-based model. . . . [E]xpertise is now
seen more and more as something practical—something based in what you can do rather than
what you can calculate or learn.”).
22. See, e.g., JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 18–22 (1914) (evidencing that similar concerns have been present
in legal education for a century now); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 87–126, 162–84 (2007) (explaining the need for a
move to more practical application-based curricula and the obstacles to such an effort); Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
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between legal education and legal practice, between academic activities and
the real world, between theory and the things that lawyers and judges actually
do.23 In this climate, defending the status quo is increasingly difficult. To
understand what these developments mean for scholarship and teaching about
legal and statutory interpretation, we need to consider what is occurring
outside scholars’ bookshelves and law school classrooms—and even outside
lawyers’ offices and judges’ chambers.
III. ACCESSIBILITY AND INACCESSIBILITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION
“Accessibility” has been a rallying cry of academic reformers in the United
States since the emergence of modern institutions of higher education in this
country in the late nineteenth century.24 In recent decades, prompted by
economic, demographic, political, and technological shifts, this theme has
taken on new implications. Over the past generation or so, policymakers,
administrators, and the public have come to conceive of higher education as
part of a more general system of private enterprise, rather than as a public
good.25 One result of this shift has been to encourage those making policy
decisions and seeking funding for the academy to define their goals and
activities in private-enterprise terms.26 This new way of describing academic
activity requires the identification of educational products and direct
communication with the market for those products.
Those who focus on the legal academy have seen these trends in several
specific developments over the past couple of years. An even wider audience
learned of them through the series of articles by David Segal published in the
New York Times starting in January of 2011.27 Segal’s pieces, critical of law

MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35, 42 (1992) (drawing attention to the disparity between academia and
practice and its detrimental effects on the legal profession); see also infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. COHEN & CARRIE B. KISKER, THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION: EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF THE CONTEMPORARY SYSTEM 420–21,
464–78 (2d ed. 2010); see generally BILL READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS (1996).
25. See COHEN & KISKER, supra note 24, at 514–49, 559–61; see also READINGS, supra
note 24, at 164–65, 177.
26. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY 1–4, 181–206 (2004) (describing higher education entities’ shift to using profitfocused methods and terminology in their operations).
27. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BU1; David
Segal, Behind the Curve, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, Law School
Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, What They Don’t Teach
Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1; David Segal, A Possible New
Curriculum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at N23; David Segal, The Price to Play Its Way, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, For 2nd Year, a Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B1; see also Editorial, Legal Education Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, at A18; Archive of Articles in Room for Debate: The Case Against Law
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schools’ financial models and curricula, brought renewed attention to the Law
School Transparency (LST) initiative begun in 2009 by two law students.28
Dedicated to “improving consumer information and to reforming the
traditional law school model,” along the lines of disclosure initiatives in other
sectors, LST gathers and makes available data about the employment of U.S.
law school graduates.29 Faculty from prominent law schools have also joined
student and journalistic demands for access to information and for institutional,
curricular, and financial reform: two especially influential examples are Brian
Tamanaha of Washington University, who published a book-length critique
with a major academic press in 2012,30 and Paul Campos of the University of
Colorado, who from August 2011 to early 2013 posted daily exposes on his
blog, Inside the Law School Scam.31
All of these initiatives describe the academy, and the legal academy in
particular, as an accessible space that should be offering accessible products.32
The products in question include student degrees but also, traditionally,
scholarship. The differences between these products—and their potential
irrelevance to one another—are familiar themes in the academic reform
discussion.33 Their similarities are less often noted, but these similarities are
important, especially for the topic of this symposium. Both the scholarly and
the educational products of the legal academy are specialized discourse
products: for students, the ability to participate in a specialized discourse
community,34 and for scholars, contributions to a different specialized
discourse community in which various features of the first discourse
community are discussed and debated.35

School, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/21/the-caseagainst-law-school.
28. See generally LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com (last
visited Jan. 6, 2013). Media mentions of LST have increased throughout 2011 and 2012. LST
Recognition, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/recognition
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
29. About LST, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/about
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
30. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
31. Paul F. Campos, INSIDE THE LAW SCH. SCAM, http://insidethelawschoolscam.blog
spot.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
32. See, e.g., Paul F. Campos, Bleg: Help Circulate the Law School Transparency Petition,
INSIDE THE LAW SCH. SCAM (Oct. 21, 2011, 6:05 a.m.), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.
com/2011/10/bleg-circulating-law-school.html; supra notes 25–26; text accompanying supra note
29.
33. See supra note 27.
34. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK
LIKE A LAWYER” 3–4 (2007).
35. For a summary of some of the literature exploring academic discourse communities, see
Karen Petroski, Does It Matter What We Say About Legal Interpretation?, 43 MCGEORGE L.
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Scholars have always had to make a case for the utility of what they are
doing, but there is now more pressure on them than ever before to make that
case in terms accessible to their consumers, and their institutional environment
is reinforcing that pressure.36 In the legal academy, this translates into a drive
to make legal education accessible to outsiders: to define the enterprise in a
way that can be understood and valued by everyone. Since part of the
enterprise involves the production of scholarship, there is pressure to make that
product, too—including theories of law and interpretation—as accessible as
possible. Shapiro’s and Scalia’s recent books are wonderful examples of the
effects of this pressure, and their inherent interest and conceptual rigor are not
compromised by their accessibility.37
The above discussion probably understates the importance of the
imperative of accessibility in the contemporary legal academy, as well as
higher education more generally. But accessibility is not the only imperative
affecting the work of legal scholars and educators. Indeed, certain structural
features of higher education and law, as those systems have developed in the
United States over the past century, make accessibility a real challenge to
attain. For one thing, the structure of scholarly enterprise encourages scholars
to stake out personal positions that differ from the positions taken by other
scholars, often on minor points.38 The scholarly products of the academy, that
is, are produced within a system that has classically rewarded producers of
those products that both document their producers’ expertise—measured by the
embedding of those products within a system of specialized communication—
and contribute to the continued functioning of such systems of specialized
communication—by prompting differentiated responses from other producers
or sometimes entire subsystems of new products applying details of earlier
scholarly products to new topics.39 The best works of legal theory—including
Professor Eskridge’s work—perform the latter function; they are not just
REV. 359, 368–74 (2012) [hereinafter Petroski, Does It Matter] (discussing “[s]cholarly
approaches to the study of academic practice”); Karen Petroski, Legal Fictions and the Limits of
Legal Language, INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2013).
36. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 26, at 22–23, 29, 113–16, 302, 333.
37. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Forward to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at xxvi.
38. See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES 21–27 (2001); RANDALL COLLINS,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: A GLOBAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL CHANGE 80–82
(1998).
39. See, e.g., Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement: Benefit or
Beauty Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374, 375 (2006) (arguing that high-quality articles are cited
regardless of the review’s prestige); Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars:
Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
871, 888–90 (1996) (finding that articles published in more prestigious schools’ journals are more
likely to be cited); Petroski, Does It Matter, supra note 35, at 366 n.35, 387–88; Ronald D.
Rotunda, Law Reviews—The Extreme Centrist Position, 62 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing
article selection).
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exercises in hairsplitting that are comprehensible only to a handful of
specialists, but speak to experts in a number of areas. This kind of scholarly
work is not possible, however, in the absence of a broader field of
differentiated specialist knowledge areas that a path-breaking theorist can
bridge through his or her work. The consequences of these dynamics of
scholarly production include the diversity of scholarly positions that Professor
Eskridge explores in his lecture and that, well beyond this symposium, fill the
pages of law reviews and the shelves of law school libraries.40
A second force in the legal academy working against accessibility is the
nature of legal training, which gives graduates the ability to participate in a
particular professional discourse that the general public is unable to navigate.
Like other professional discourses, legal discourse depends for its authority on
being nontransferable, or in a certain sense inaccessible.41 Clients need lawyers
because nonlawyers lack the ability to communicate according to legal
conventions; lawyers’ ability to so communicate is fundamental to every
service they perform as lawyers. It follows that, should those conventions
become available to and understandable by all—should they become radically
accessible—the demand for lawyers’ services would disappear or at least
change virtually beyond recognition.42 Even if legal education were to be
reformed to address only and all of what lawyers-in-training need to know and
do in order to join the profession, then, it would continue to involve training in
an inherently esoteric art.
In both of these senses, there is a certain devotion to inaccessibility built
into the project of legal education. We can understand the current crisis in that
institution as, among other things, a product of the clash of these competing
pressures toward accessibility and away from it, particularly as those pressures
are manifested in communicative products and skills.
CONCLUSION: ACCESSIBILITY ALL THE WAY UP?
Given the imperative of accessibility, can we accept a continued
commitment to inaccessibility in the projects of legal education, scholarship,
and theory? Should we? Or should we strive for accessibility all the way up? I
present these remarks in the hope that they might inspire others to agree with

40. See Karen Petroski, Is Post-Positivism Possible?, 12 GERMAN L.J. 663, 681–84 (2011)
(discussion of how several particular scholars have fit into the development of Anglo-American
legal positivism in comparable ways, despite the distinct subject matter and approach of each
individual).
41. See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 86–91 (1988).
42. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES 6–7 (2008).
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me that we need to discuss these questions more explicitly if we hope to make
real progress on the task of legal education reform.
The theoretical disagreement over what exactly interpretation is—despite
the agreement that whatever it is, it is central to what lawyers do—is
encouraged by the dynamics of scholarly activity, and also perhaps by a shared
and only partly recognized drive to keep the core activity of lawyers
contestable and inaccessible. The absence of consensus about what
interpretation involves is not just a result of scholarly competition or a focus on
an inherently elusive concept but also a matter of collective, tribal selfpreservation. We will need to decide as a group whether this reluctance to
work toward a common and easily communicated understanding of our core
activity is something we want to work against. We will need to decide, that is,
whether we want the concept and practice of legal interpretation to be radically
accessible, whether accessibility would change that practice beyond
recognition, and whether a society operating with a radically accessible form
of legal interpretation is the society we want. There are no simple answers to
these questions, but it will be hard to agree on the direction legal education
should take if we do not address them.
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APPENDIX: COURSES ON LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION OFFERED AT
SELECTED LAW SCHOOLS DURING THE 2012–13 ACADEMIC YEAR
Columbia Law School: Requires 1Ls to take Foundations of the Regulatory
State (three credits). First-year students may also elect to take courses on
Legislation (three credits) or Legislation and Regulation (three credits; both of
these courses are also open to upper-level students). In 2012–13, offered
upper-level electives on Advanced Constitutional Law: Law and Political
Process (three credits); The Constitution (two credits; a seminar on techniques
of constitutional interpretation); a seminar on Contracts, Collaboration and
Interpretation (three credits); a course on Financial Statement Analysis and
Interpretation (three credits); a seminar on History and Constitutional
Authority (two credits); a seminar on Legal Interpretation (three credits;
focusing primarily on statutory and constitutional interpretation); and a course
on Reading the Constitution (two credits).43
Fordham University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an intensive course
in Congressional Investigations (two credits), and the 1L course in Legislation
and Regulation for evening students (four credits). Appears to require 1Ls to
take a spring course in Legislation and Regulation (offered in spring 2013, five
sections, four credits). Also offered in spring 2013 a course in Legislative
Drafting (three credits). Has previously offered courses in Constitutional
Interpretation (fall 2010, three credits); Election Law (spring 2010, fall 2010,
two credits); Election Law and the Presidency (spring 2012, three credits);
History, Originalism, and the Founders’ Constitution (spring 2012, two
credits); Language of the Constitution (spring 2010, two credits); Legislative
Drafting (fall 2010, three credits); Regulatory Drafting (three credits); and
Statutory Interpretation and Separation of Powers (fall 2010, two credits).44
Georgetown University Law Center: In fall 2012, offered an elective in
Federal Money: Policymaking and Budget Rules (three credits); an elective
seminar on Lawmaking and Statutory Interpretation (three credits); the upperlevel elective Lawmaking: Introduction to Statutory and Regulatory
Interpretation (three credits); an upper-level elective Tax Treaties: A Practical
Approach to Interpretation and Application (one credit); and a Federal
Legislation and Administrative Clinic (up to ten credits). A planned seminar in
Congressional Investigations (three credits) was cancelled. In spring 2013,
required the first-year course Government Processes (four credits), and offered

43. See Courses, COLUMBIA L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013).
44. See Past Course Offerings, FORDHAM SCH. OF L., http://law.fordham.edu/registrar/
2775.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); Class Schedules, FORDHAM SCH. OF L., http://law.ford
ham.edu/registrar/2750.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); Course Descriptions, FORDHAM SCH. OF
L., http://law.fordham.edu/16158.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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the upper-level electives Congressional Investigations Seminar (two credits);
Congressional Procedure and Legislative History Seminar (three credits); the
How to Work the Hill: A Guide to Lawyering in the Congress practicum (five
credits); a continuation of the Lawmaking and Statutory Interpretation seminar
(two credits); Lawmaking: Introduction to Statutory and Regulatory
Interpretation (three credits); and Political and Lobbying Activities of TaxExempt Organizations (two credits); as well as a continuation of the Federal
Legislation and Administrative Clinic (up to ten credits).45
Harvard Law School: Required first-years to take a course in Legislation and
Regulation (seven sections, in spring 2013). In fall 2012, offered an upperlevel seminar in Advanced Legislation: Theories of Statutory Interpretation,
and an upper-level elective on Law and the Political Process. In spring 2013,
offered an elective (taught by a Kennedy School professor) on the U.S.
Congress and Law Making (covering the legislative process).46
New York University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered a course on
Legislation and the Regulatory State (four credits) for transfer and LLM
students. In spring 2013, offered a required 1L course on Legislation and the
Regulatory State (four credits, four sections), as well as electives on Federal
Budget Policy and Process (two or three credits); Legislation and Political
Theory (three or four credits); and The Law of Democracy (four credits).47
Northwestern University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an elective in
American Democracy (three credits). No legislation-related courses were
offered during the winter term. In spring 2013, offered an elective in
Legislation (three credits).48
Stanford Law School: In fall 2012, offered electives on Direct Democracy
(two or three credits) and Statutory Interpretation (three credits), as well as a
course on the legislative process, Legislative Simulation: The Federal Budget
(three credits). In winter 2013, offered an elective on The United States Senate
as a Legal Institution (three credits; taught by Russ Feingold). In spring 2013,
offered an elective on Regulation of the Political Process (four credits).49

45. See Curriculum Guide: Courses, GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. CTR., http://apps.law.george
town.edu/curriculum/tab_courses.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
46. See Harvard Law School Course Catalog, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.
edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
47. See Search Course Descriptions, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/
index.cfm? (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
48. See Course Catalog, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/curriculum/coursecatalog/term.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
49. See Courses, STANFORD L. SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/courses (last visited Mar.
31, 2013).
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University of California, Berkeley School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an
elective on the Law of Democracy (three credits). In spring 2013, offered an
elective on Legislation (three credits).50
University of California, Hastings College of the Law: Requires 1Ls to take
a “Statutory Elective” in the spring semester; in spring 2013, the elective
options were Education Law; Employment Discrimination Law;
Environmental Law; Federal Income Taxation; and Legislation, Statutory
Interpretation, and the Administrative State (each three units). In fall 2012,
offered a course on Legislative Process (three units) and a Public Policy
Advocacy Seminar (two units). In spring 2013, offered a course in Statutory
Interpretation and Bill Drafting (three units); an Advanced Legislative Process
Seminar (two units); and a Voting Rights Seminar (two units); as well as a
Legislation Clinic (up to twelve points).51
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law: In fall 2012, offered
an upper-level elective on Statutory Interpretation (two credits). Did not offer
any legislation- or interpretation-related courses in spring 2013; a skills course
on Public Policy Advocacy was not offered in the 2012–13 year.52
University of Chicago Law School: In fall 2012, offered an elective on Legal
Interpretation (three credits, taught by Judge Frank Easterbrook). No
interpretation courses were offered during the winter quarter, although Election
Law (three credits) was offered. In spring 2012, offered an elective in
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (three credits), as well as one in Public
Choice (three credits). Throughout the year, offered a Mental Health Advocacy
Clinic (one to two credits, includes legislative advocacy).53
University of Michigan Law School: In fall 2012, offered an elective on
Legislation and Regulation (four credits), and an upper-level elective on
Voting Rights and Election Law (four credits, two sections). In spring 2013,
again offered the Legislation and Regulation elective (four credits).54
University of Missouri School of Law: Offered no legislation- or
interpretation-focused courses in fall 2012, but did offer an upper-level elective
in Election Law (one to three credits). In spring 2013, offered upper-level
elective on Legislation (one to three credits) and a Legislative Practicum (one

50. See Courses@Boalt, BERKELEY SCH. OF L., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-pro
grams/courses/courseSearch.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
51. See UNIV. OF CALIF. HASTINGS SCH. OF L., 2012–2013 Course Catalog 3–4, 26, 41, 29,
31, 44, 56–57 (2012), http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/catalog/docs/CAT12-13.pdf.
52. See Curriculum Guide, UCLA SCH. OF L., https://curriculum.law.ucla.edu/Guide/All
Courses/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
53. See Offerings, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/courses (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013).
54. See Office of Student Records, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/
currentstudents/registration/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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to three credits). Previously-offered courses not offered in 2012–13 included
an elective on Advocacy and Government Agencies (one to three credits).55
University of Missouri, Kansas City School of Law: Fall 2012 course
listings were not available in spring 2013. In spring 2013, offered no
legislation- or interpretation-related courses. Lists as occasionally offered a
course in Legislation (two to three units) and a Seminar in Constitutional
Interpretation (two to three units).56
University of Pennsylvania Law School: In fall 2012, offered an elective on
the Originalism Debate and the Constitution (three credits). In spring 2013,
offered electives on Election Law (two credits) and Political Law (two credits),
as well as a Legislative Clinic (two credits).57
University of Texas at Austin School of Law: In fall 2012, offered a clinical
program in Legislative Lawyering (three credits, with a three-credit practice
skills companion course) and an elective in Texas Legislation: Practice and
Procedure (two credits, taught by former Texas legislator J.E. Brown). In
spring 2013, offered an elective in Antitrust: Economic Analysis and
Legislative Interpretation (four credits); a continuation of the Legislative
Lawyering clinic and practice skills course (three credits apiece); a Legislative
Internship (three credits); an elective seminar on Originalism and Its Critics
(two credits); and an elective seminar on Legislative Process (three credits).58
University of Virginia School of Law: In fall 2012, offered electives on
Constitutionalism: History and Jurisprudence (three credits); Legislative
Drafting and Public Policy (three credits); and Regulation of the Political
Process (three credits). No legislation-oriented courses were offered during the
January term. In spring 2013, offered electives on Government Ethics:
Conflicts of Interest, Lobbying, and Campaign Finance (three credits), and
Legislation (three credits).59
Washington University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an intensivecourse elective on The Interaction of Business, Government, and Public Policy
in a Democratic Society (one credit), and a Congressional and Administrative

55. See JD Program Course Descriptions, UNIV. OF MO. SCH. OF L., http://law.missouri.
edu/academics/curriculum.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
56. See UNIV. OF MO. KANSAS CITY SCH. OF L., UMKC School of Law Alphabetical Course
Listing 5, 20, http://www1.law.umkc.edu/academic/Course_Listings.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2013); UNIV. OF MO. KANSAS CITY SCH. OF L, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of
Law—Schedule of Courses Spring Semester 2013 13 (2013), http://law.umkc.edu/pdfs/
registration-sp13-course-schedule.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
57. See Penn Law Spring 2013 Courses, UNIV. OF PENN. L. SCH., https://courses.law.upenn.
edu (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
58. See Course Schedule and Descriptions, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN SCH. OF L.,
http://utdirect.utexas.edu/loreg/clst.WBX (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
59. See Current Courses, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L., http://lawnotes2.law.virginia.edu/
lawweb/course.nsf/CbTbN (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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Law Internship (up to fourteen credits). In spring 2013, offered an upper-level
elective on Legislation (three credits); an elective seminar on American
Democracy and the Policy Making Process (three credits); an intensive-course
elective on The Interaction of Business, Government, and Public Policy in a
Democratic Society (one credit); an elective course on Organizing, Coalition
Building, and Lobbying (three credits); and the Congressional and
Administrative Law Internship (up to fourteen credits).60
Yale Law School: In fall 2012, offered an upper-level elective on Legislation
(four credits) and a Legislative Advocacy Clinic (three credits). Also offered
upper-level seminars on Reading the Constitution: Method and Substance (four
credits) and The Judicial Role in Constitutional Interpretation: Comparing the
U.S. and Canada (one or two credits), as well as a reading group on
Contemporary Originalism (one credit). In spring 2013, offered electives
Introduction to the Regulatory State (three credits, open to 1Ls, but not
mandatory), The Law of Democracy (three credits, covering some aspects of
the legislative process), and Legislation (three credits), as well as a
continuation of the Legislative Advocacy Clinic, and an elective (open to 1Ls)
on The Politics of Method: Law and Economics and Originalism (two
credits).61

60. See Course Information and Directory, WASHINGTON UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://law.
wustl.edu/registrar/pages.aspx?id=2124 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
61. See Fall 2012 Course Overview, YALE L. SCH., http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/prereg/
course_overview.asp?Term=Fall (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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